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manufacturer may be substantially better off choosing her wholesale prices not
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1 Introduction
Consider a manufacturer selling to final consumers through different retailers. When
setting prices, one of her main goals is to restrict retailers’ ability to set high markups.
These markups naturally depend on the degree of competition between retailers. Con-
ventional wisdom from different setups then suggest that the manufacturer would have
an incentive to set identical wholesale prices across the different retailers, so that they
engage in fiercer competition that leads to higher demand. In this paper we show, how-
ever, that in consumer search markets there is an additional force that may result in
a manufacturer setting different wholesale prices to different retailers, as a way to give
consumers incentives to search. This consumer search effect is an additional stimulus
for retailers to compete. It is the aim of our paper to investigate the optimal use of
asymmetric wholesale prices to retailers operating in a search market.
In markets where consumers incur a search cost, it is inevitable that retail margins
are positive. If all consumers incur a positive search cost and a manufacturer sets
identical wholesale prices across retailers, the maximal profit she can hope to obtain is
the double marginalization profit. The reason is that there is a Diamond paradox at the
retail level (cf., Diamond (1971)): for any given equilibrium wholesale price, retailers
will always choose the retail monopoly price.
Our first result is that if the manufacturer can commit to a wholesale pricing struc-
ture, she can do strictly better if consumer search cost is small by choosing a negative
correlation across prices. The reason is as follows. When the search cost is small, the
manufacturer is tempted to squeeze retailers by setting a wholesale price that is equal
to the consumer reservation price. But since consumers expect both retailers to get
the same wholesale price, they are willing to buy at an even higher price, and retailers
can still make a considerable positive margin, making the deviation not profitable. If
the manufacturer creates a negative correlation between wholesale prices, knowing that
retailers will optimally react and set asymmetric retail prices, then consumers observ-
ing the higher price infer there is a reasonably high chance that the other retailer sets
a lower price as the latter probably received the lower of the wholesale prices set by
the manufacturer. This will make consumer more eager to search, putting downward
pressure on retail margins. Interestingly, one of the two prices the manufacturer may
choose with positive probability can be quite low and even below cost (and not profit
maximizing on its own) somewhat similar to the literature on loss leaders (Hess and
Gerstner (1987) and Lal and Matutes (1994)). In contrast, in the setting we study, a
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manufacturer only sells one product and he sells to one retailer at a price below cost
in order to restrict the competing retailer to exploit his market power due to consumer
search cost. Thus, in our model, selling at price below cost is a way to stimulate con-
sumers to search. We show that, when search costs are very low, the manufacturer
can obtain almost monopoly profits by carefully exploiting this asymmetry. Moreover,
even if the manufacturer lacks full commitment to a price distribution, she can ob-
tain substantially higher profits than the double marginalization outcome by using a
deterministic asymmetric price schedule.
We next consider the Stahl (1989) solution to the Diamond paradox, where con-
sumers are heterogeneous in their search cost and some consumers have a positive
search cost, whereas others (the shoppers) have zero search cost. In that model, the
manufacturer can benefit choosing a correlated wholesale pricing structure even if it
cannot commit to it as the manufacturer optimally trade-offs the benefits from having
retailers competing more fiercely for the shoppers if retailers buy at identical prices and
the benefits from having retailers not being able to employ their market power over the
non-shoppers.
Finally, we allow the manufacturer to set non-linear contracts to her retailers. We
show that our main conclusion, namely that manufacturers may benefit from choosing
asymmetric contracts across different retailers when retailers compete in consumer mar-
kets, continues to hold if manufacturers choose two-part tariffs. In this setting, when
restricting the manufacturer to symmetric contracts, her rents are non-monotonic in
the fraction of shoppers: she may extract monopoly rents both when all consumers
are shoppers (Bertrand competition in the retail market) and when all consumers are
non-shoppers, but not in between. Retail price dispersion creates noise in the man-
ufacturer profit function, restricting the rents she can extract. By treating retailers
asymmetrically, the manufacturer eliminates the retail price dispersion (and the noise
from his perspective). We show that for intermediate values of the fraction of shoppers,
the manufacturer may benefit behaving this way.
The literature on consumer search in vertical markets is small (Janssen and Shelegia
(2015), Lubensky (2013) and Garcia et al. (Forthcoming)). In the monopoly manufac-
turer model of Janssen and Shelegia (2015) the incentive to squeeze retailers leads to
a non-existence of reservation price equilibrium for certain parameter values. In Gar-
cia et al. (Forthcoming) this same incentive leads to the existence of an equilibrium
where oligopolistic manufacturers randomize over two prices leading to an equilibrium
with a bimodal price distribution. The current paper solves the nonexistence result in
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Janssen and Shelegia (2015) by allowing a manufacturer to set individualised prices to
retailers. At the same time, we extend the randomization exploited in the oligopolistic
model of Garcia et al. (Forthcoming) and show that this can be imitated by a monopoly
manufacturer.
The paper is also related to the literature on price discrimination in input markets.
So far, this literature has focused on the issue of whether a supplier wants to strengthen
or weaken a-priori differences in terms of market access or cost structure across different
retailers. The earlier work (Katz (1987) and DeGraba (1990)) studies third-degree price
discrimination among retailers with heterogeneous costs who compete a´ la Cournot. In
this setup, the monopolist has an incentive to foster competition by discriminating
in favor of the least efficient firms, thus decreasing welfare. More recent contributions,
however, provide more nuanced results (see, e.g. Yoshida (2000) and Inderst and Valletti
(2009)). Our paper takes a different approach and gives a rationale for asymmetric
treatment of ex-ante homogeneous retailers as a way to extract rents in vertically related
industries. We find that in a variety of settings, the manufacturer has an incentive to
treat ex ante symmetric retailers asymmetrically.
The paper also relates to the literature on sales. An important strand of papers,
starting with Varian (1980), interprets sales as a sample path generated by an underly-
ing static mixed strategy equilibrium. They predict no correlation across time or across
different sellers. A different approach, introduced by Sobel (1984), rationalizes sales as
a price discrimination device, which induces serial correlation over time. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first study that predicts contemporaneous correlation of
sales across stores. Importantly, our model predicts either positive or negative correla-
tion, depending on market characteristics. As such, it introduces a new set of testable
predictions to be confronted with real world data. The empirical literature on sales is
relatively scarce. There is evidence that a large part of the within-product variation
in prices occurs at the store level (Kaplan et al. (2016)). Whether this is only due to
demand-side heterogeneity or can also be attributed to vertical relations is still an open
question. Another stylized fact in the empirical sales literature is that sales are almost
independent across stores (Pesendorfer (2002)). Since the returns of a discount for
the seller depend on the discounts offered by competitors, this empirical result seems
paradoxical. Our model predicts that positive or negative correlation is expected in
different environments and in different equilibria. Possibly, this ”independence results”
stems from not distinguishing that data may be collected from different enviornments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the model and
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equilibrium concept. In section 3 we discuss the case of homogeneous consumers, while
in section 4 we treat the heterogeneous consumer case. Both sections deal with the
situation where the manufacturer may and may not be able to commit to his pricing
decisions. Section 5 deals with nonlinear prices, while Section 6 concludes. All proofs
are contained in the Appendix.
2 Retail Search Markets with a Monopoly Manu-
facturer
The model we study is very similar in nature to the one in Janssen and Shelegia (2015)
and introduces a wholesale level in the search model developed by Stahl (1989), where a
monopolistic manufacturer sells a homogenous product to two retailers. The difference
with Janssen and Shelegia (2015) is that we explicitly allow the manufacturer to choose
different prices to different retailers and that we explicitly distinguish between different
scenarios.
A single manufacturer has the technology to produce a certain good. The manufac-
turer chooses (linear) prices (w1, w2) for each unit it sells to retailer 1 and 2.
1 We allow
the manufacturer to choose random prices, and the randomization may involve positive
or negative correlation. The distribution of wholesale prices chosen by the manufac-
turer is denoted by G(w1, w2). For simplicity, we abstract away from the issue of how
the cost of the manufacturer is determined and set this cost equal to 0.2 Retailers
take the wholesale price (their marginal cost) wi as given and compete in prices. The
distribution of retail prices charged by the retailers is denoted by F (p;wi) (with density
f(p;wi)). Each firm’s objective is to maximize profits given their beliefs about prices
charged by other firms and given consumers’ behavior.
On the demand side of the market, we have a continuum of risk-neutral consumers
with identical preferences. A fraction λ ∈ [0, 1) of consumers, the shoppers, have zero
search cost. Note that we explicitly allow for λ = 0, and the next Section is completely
devoted to this case. Shoppers sample all prices and buy at the lowest price. The
remaining fraction 1−λ of non-shoppers, have positive search cost s > 0 for every second
1Nonlinear prices are considered in Section 5.
2To focus on the new insights derived from studying the vertical relation between retailers and
manufacturers in a search environment, we assume all market participants know that the manufac-
turer’s cost equals 0. Alternatively, the manufacturer’s cost could be set by a third party or could be
uncertain. However, this would create additional complexity that may obscure the results.
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search they make.3 If a consumer buys at price p she demands D(p). In our general
analysis we assume that the demand function is thrice continuously differentiable, and
in addition satisfies the following regularity properties: (i) −∞ < D′(p) < 0, (ii)
for some finite P, D(p) = 0 for all p ≥ P and D(p) > 0 otherwise, (iii) for every
w < p, pir(p;w) ≡ (p − w)D(p) is strictly concave and maximized at pm(w), the retail
monopoly price for a given wholesale price, and (iv) for all given w, (p−w)pi′r(p)/pir(p)2
is decreasing in p for all p ∈ (w, pm(w)].4 We define the wholesale monopoly price wm
by
wm = arg max
w≥0
wD(p∗(w)).
In the special case of linear demand D(p) = 1−p we have pm(w) = 1+w
2
and wm = 1/2.
The timing is as follows. First, the manufacturer chooses (w1, w2), where each
retailer observes her own wholesale price, but may, or may not know the price set
for the other. Consumers do not observe the individual wholesale prices. Given the
manufacturer observed choice each retailer i sets price pi. Finally, consumers engage in
optimal sequential search given the equilibrium distribution of retail prices, not knowing
the actual prices set by individual retailers.
As consumers do not observe the wholesale price, the retail market cannot be an-
alyzed as a separate sub-game for a given w. To accommodate this asymmetric in-
formation feature we use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) as the solution concept,
focusing on equilibria where buyers use reservation price strategies where non-shoppers
buy at a retail price p ≤ ρ. The reservation price ρ is based on beliefs about (w1, w2),
and in equilibrium, these beliefs are correct. PBE imposes the requirement that retail-
ers respond optimally to any w, not only the equilibrium wholesale price. When there
are shoppers, there may be price dispersion at the retail level and we denote by p(wi)
and p¯(wi) the lower- and upper- bound of the equilibrium price support after observing
wholesale price wi.
3Our analysis for low search cost is unaffected when consumers also have to incur a cost for the
first search. For higher search cost, the analysis would become more complicated (see, Janssen et al.
(2005) for an analysis of the participation decision of non-shoppers in the Stahl model where the first
search is not free). Janssen and Parakhonyak (2014) show that the Stahl equilibrium is unaffected by
costly recall.
4These are standard assumptions in this literature. For example, the last condition (accounting for
the fact that retailers’ marginal cost is w) is used by Stahl (1989) to prove that the reservation price is
uniquely defined. Stahl (1989) shows that the condition is satisfied for all concave demand functions
and also for the demand function of the form D(p) = (1− p)β , with β ∈ (0, 1).
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3 Retail Management in the absence of shoppers
In this Section we consider markets where all consumers incur a positive search cost,
i.e., there are no shoppers. Thus, the model in this Section is the monopolistic version
of the model in Garcia et al. (Forthcoming). To understand the role of commitment in
this market, we first consider the easiest case where the manufacturer cannot commit
to any price level.
3.1 No Price commitment
We start the analysis by showing that despite the fact that the wholesale price is un-
restricted, the equilibrium distribution of wholesale prices can put positive probability
mass on at most two prices, wm and a properly defined consumer reservation price ρ.
This feature of the model is identical to that in Garcia et al. (Forthcoming). To provide
some intuition for this result, let w be the lower bound of the wholesale price distribu-
tion and let p(w) be the corresponding downstream price. As in any equilibrium the
retail price reaction p(w)˙ must be weakly increasing, it is clear that all consumers buy at
p(w). Thus, by a standard Diamond paradox argument, it must be that p(w) = pm(w).
Given this, clearly w = wm. Now consider any other price w ≤ ρ. Either p(w) = ρ
or p(w) < ρ. Since ρ is determined by consumers’ beliefs, the manufacturer maximizes
wD(ρ) by choosing w = ρ. If p(w) < ρ, then p(w) = pm(w) and the optimal wholesale
price is wm.5
To further characterize the possible equilibrium configurations, we use the notation
pim = wmD(pm(wm)) and pi(ρ) = ρD(ρ) and write expected manufacturer profits as
Π = G(wm, wm)2pim + 2G(wm, ρ)[pim + pi(ρ)] +G(ρ, ρ)2pi(ρ),
where (if G(ρ, ρ) +G(wm, ρ) > 0)
G(wm, ρ)
G(ρ, ρ) +G(wm, ρ)
∫ ρ
pm
D(p)dp = s.6 (1)
If we implicitly define w by wmD(pm) = wD(w), then we can define s as
∫ w
pm
D(p)dp =
s. It is easy to see then that if s > s¯, we should have G(wm, wm) = 1 as there is no temp-
tation for the manufacturer to deviate to ρ (as for ρ implicitly defined by
∫ ρ
pm
D(p)dp = s
5Any w > ρ is dominated by ρ because the wD(w) is decreasing if w > pm(wm).
6If G(wm, wm) = 1, then ρ is defined by
∫ ρ
pm
D(p)dp = s.
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we have that wmD(pm) > ρD(ρ)). When s decreases and becomes equal to s¯ we have
that
∫ ρ
pm
D(p)dp = s and wmD(pm) = ρD(ρ). Finally, if s < s¯ from the manufacturer’s
profit equation it follows that it has to be the case that pim = pi(ρ) as otherwise, without
commitment he can deviate and set both its prices equal to ρ. This condition uniquely
determines ρ > pm(wm). Given that he is indifferent, the manufacturer may still ran-
domize over wm and ρ and it may even choose to a form of affiliation between the two
prices. In fact, there is a continuum of choices he can make, where the ratio of G(ρ, ρ) to
G(wm, ρ) is determined by (1) and G(wm, wm)+G(ρ, ρ)+2G(wm, ρ) = 1. In particular,
as will be important in the next Section, there are equilibria in which the manufacturer
sets G(wm, wm) = 0, but in principle, all G(wm, wm), G(ρ, ρ) and 2G(wm, ρ) could be
strictly positive.
Proposition 1. There exists a critical search cost level s¯ such that if s > s¯, the unique
equilibrium has G(wm, wm) = 1, whereas when 0 < s < s¯, there is a continuum of
equilibria where the manufacturer gives positive probability to wm and ρ, with pim = pi(ρ),
and G(w
m,ρ)
G(ρ,ρ)
being determined by (1).
In all these equilibria, the manufacturer obtains the double marginalization profit
level and he has no incentive to choose different prices or to change the probability
distribution over the two prices. What is interesting is when s equals s¯, then we have
that G(ρ, ρ)) = 0, while G(wm, ρ) > 0. That is for relatively large s, it is in the interest
of the manufacturer to create sales that are negatively correlated. On the other hand,
when s approaches 0 the probability G(wm, ρ) should approach 0 as well. Thus, for a
given G(wm, wm) > 0, this implies that sales should be positively correlated when s
becomes arbitrarily small. Given the multiplicity of equilibria for intermediate values
of s, sales could be both positively and negatively correlated.
3.2 Full Commitment
We start the analysis of the full commitment case by showing that, similarly to the
no commitment case, the optimal distribution of wholesale prices may put probability
mass in at most two prices, w0 and a properly defined consumer reservation price
ρ. An important difference with the no commitment case analyzed above is that the
manufacturer optimally distorts w0 in order to foster search, so that w0 ≤ wm.
Lemma 2. The optimal price distribution has positive probability mass in at most two
price levels: w0 ≤ wm and ρ.
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Denote by pi(w) = wD(p¯(w)) where p¯(w) = min{pm(w), ρ}. Using this notation, we
have that the manufacturer’s profit can be written as
Π = G(w0, w0)2pi(w0) + 2G(w0, ρ)[pi(w0) + pi(ρ)] +G(ρ, ρ)2pi(ρ), (2)
where (if G(ρ, ρ)+G(w0, ρ) > 0) and because in equilibrium it has to be that G(ρ, ρ) < 1
G(w0, ρ)
G(ρ, ρ) +G(w0, ρ)
∫ ρ
pm(w0)
D(p)dp = s. (3)
The first trivial observation is that under commitment either G(w0, w0) = 0 or
G(w0, w0) = 1 and w0 = w
m. To see this note that G(w0, w0) does not affect ρ and that
the manufacturer can always guarantee himself a profit of wmD(pm(wm)). At s = s,
the manufacturer is indifferent between choosing G(wm, wm) = 1 and G(wm, ρ) = 1/2.
However, under full commitment, G(wm, ρ) = 1/2 is dominated by G(wm− ε, ρ) = 1/2
because this deviation has a second-order cost on those consumers that visit the low
cost retailer, and a first-order impact on the reservation price ρ, which leads to an
increase in the profits over those consumers visiting the high cost retailer. Thus, under
commitment and at s = s, the manufacturer strictly prefers to have a negative affiliation
between the retail prices. Notice that for very high search cost s the manufacturer’s
profits cannot exceed the double marginalization profit, so that there exists a ŝ > s
such that G(w0, w0) = 1 and w0 = w
m for all s > ŝ.
If s < ŝ we have that G(w0, w0) = 0. In that case, the reservation price is defined
by
G(w0, ρ)
1−G(w0, ρ)
∫ ρ
pm(w0)
D(p)dp = s. (4)
This implies that it is optimal for the manufacturer to commit to a pricing structure
with negative affiliation, where the manufacturer sets the wholesale price to at least
one retailer equal to the consumer reservation price. The low price and the probability
with which it is chosen mostly serve to lower the consumer reservation price to increase
profits. In particular, the lowest of the two wholesale prices has to be smaller than the
monopoly wholesale price, unlike the no commitment case. This follows from the above
argument where setting a price slightly lower than wm to one retailer increases profits.
Proposition 3. There exists an ŝ > 0 such that if s > ŝ, then G(wm, wm) = 1 and both
retailers have the same wholesale price. If s < ŝ, then G exhibits ’negative affiliation’
with G(w0, w0) = 0 and G(ρ, w0) > 0. Moreover, w0 < w
m and ρ < pm(w0).
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The next Proposition goes one step further and argues that when the consumer
search cost becomes arbitrarily small, the manufacturer can obtain profits that are ar-
bitrarily close to the monopoly profits. Given the Diamond paradox, this is surprising.
In our context, the Diamond paradox would imply that for a given (identical) whole-
sale price, retailers could guarantee themselves retail monopoly profits for any positive
search cost. The next Proposition shows that the manufacturer can prevent the Di-
amond paradox from arising at the retail level by committing to a pricing structure
with negative affiliation where for small search cost a (very) low price is charged with
arbitrarily small probability.
Proposition 4. As s → 0, the manufacturer’s profit converges to monopoly profits.
Furthermore, w0 < 0 with G(w0, ρ)→ 0 so that the firm engages in loss-leader practices.
This Proposition is also of interest for its new perspective on loss leaders. The
usual loss leader story is that a retailer such as a supermarket may sell some products
below cost in order to attract consumers that also buy other products when being in
the shop. In our framework, it is the manufacturer that sells with a certain probability
the product below cost (which is normalized to 0) to one of its retailer. The reason for
doing so is to bring the consumer reservation price close to the monopoly price so that
the manufacturer can extract maximal surplus most of the time. When s is arbitrarily
close to 0, the manufacturer has to offer this low price to one of her retailers with only a
very small probability for consumers already to continue to search IO the price is above
the monopoly price of a vertically integrated monopolist. Thus, the manufacturer is
able to extract almost monopoly profits.
In case demand is linear (D(p) = 1 − p), one can numerically find the optimal
contract for different values of s. It turns out that the optimal contract parameters are
remarkably stable for small s values. The manufacturer engages in large losses when
selling at the lower price (w0 ≈ −1.7) while setting this price with very small probability.
The manufacturer recoups these losses with almost monopoly profits at the higher of
the two prices, which equals ρ. When s ranges from 0 to 0.04, the probability G(ρ, w0)
ranges between 0 and 0.04, while ρ increases from 0.5 (the monopoly price) to 0.56.
Figure 1 shows the manufacturer profit under commitment, among other things, as a
function of s. It is the increase in the probability of selling at a loss that is responsibility
for the relatively sharp decrease in profits at increasing s, while the manufacturer does
not loose much by increasing her highest price to levels above the monopoly price.
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3.3 Partial Commitment
In some circumstances, it is obviously not realistic to assume that a manufacturer can
fully commit herself to a particular random pricing strategy. Without commitment,
the manufacturer would, however, deviate and charge the same (reservation) price to
both retailers to increase profits. Obviously, this cannot be an equilibrium. Instead,
in practice, what the manufacturer could commit to is to have some retailers that are
premium re-sellers and they are guaranteed to have a lower price than other retailers.
If the manufacturer decides to have premium re-sellers, we will say that he is partially
committed. In this Section we assume that retailers know whether they are chosen to
be a premium re-seller or not, while consumers only know whether or not there are
premium re-sellers, but do not know who they are. In the next Section, where we also
include shoppers into the analysis, we may interpret the shoppers as knowing who the
premium re-sellers are.
With two retailers, partial commitment implies that the manufacturer has one pre-
mium re-seller and and one other re-seller (retailer). thus, G(ρ, w0) =
1
2
. in this case,
the lower of the two wholesale prices has to be equal to w0 = w
m as in the no com-
mitment case. Thus, the manufacturer optimal policy under partial commitment is to
offer two contracts, one to each retailer (at prices wm and ρ∗) with∫ ρ∗
pm
D(p)dp = s. (5)
Profits of the manufacturer are then given by wmD(pm) + ρ∗D(ρ∗).
Given the above analysis, if s < s¯, this profit is actually larger than the profit
he gets by offering both retailers to buy at wm. As under full commitment we have
0 < G(ρ, w0) <
1
2
, the outcome under partial commitment is more efficient, and for two
reasons. First, there is an increase in the number of consumers buying at the lower
price from G(ρ, w0) to
1
2
. Second, the highest wholesale price that is charged is now
lower. this follows by comparing (4) and (5) and realizing that G(ρ,w0)
1−G(ρ,w0) ≤ 1.
Thus, there are two different sources of gains that the manufacturer cannot exploit
with partial commitment. First, she cannot engage in loss-leading practices. Second,
she can only offer one of her retailers the more profitable contract. As a result, the
profit gains are much more modest than under full commitment. This can be seen in
Figure 1 which depicts the gains under full commitment (green line) and under partial
commitment (red line) for linear demand (D(p) = 1− p) for different values of s. The
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s G(w0, w
m) ρ Π CS RP
0,001 0,5 0,754 0,1555 0.031 0.031
0,005 0,5 0,7708 0,151 0.029 0.031
0,01 0,5 0,7938 0,1443 0.026 0.031
0,015 0,5 0,8196 0,139 0.024 0.031
0,025 0 0,8819 0,125 0.031 0.063
Table 1: Equilibrium Outcomes with Partial Commitment
no-commitment benchmark corresponds to 1/8.
Figure 1: Gains from different levels of commitment
Nevertheless, when the search cost parameter is sufficiently small, a system with one
premium re-seller and one ordinary retailer may still significantly increase manufacturer
profit compared to the situation where she sells to both retailers at the same price.
When search cost approaches 0, the gains reach up to 24.1% as can be seen in the next
Table (where RP stands for retail profit).
4 Retail Management with retail competition
In this Section, we consider markets where a fraction λ of consumers, the shoppers, have
zero search cost. This introduces a competition incentive between retailers. Competi-
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tion between retailers generally will benefit the manufacturer as it leads to lower retail
prices for given wholesale prices. Under the interpretation that asymmetries between
retailers are persistent (e.g. because some sellers are premium retailers), shoppers could
be interpreted as consumers who know which retailer is the premium reseller, whereas
others may only know (or expect) that some retailers have lower prices without knowing
who.
The introduction of shoppers makes the model we consider in this Section identical
to the one analyzed in Janssen and Shelegia (2015). In what follows, we will distinguish
again between the commitment and the no commitment case, but the difference with
Janssen and Shelegia (2015) is that we allow the manufacturer to randomize her pricing
decisions and to consciously create asymmetries between retailers. With commitment,
both consumers and retailers know the correlation structure of the wholesale prices.
Moreover, retailers know their own wholesale price and update their beliefs about the
wholesale price of their competitor. Both consumers and retailers respond optimally
according to their knowledge. Janssen and Shelegia (2015) considered a special case
where the manufacturer chooses to set the same wholesale price to both retailers. In that
case, both retailers and consumers act as if they observe the wholesale contracts. With-
out commitment, wholesale contracts are private information between manufacturers
and individual retailers, and along the equilibrium path both retailers and consumers
update their beliefs about the wholesale price of the other retailer. We will deal with
off-the-equilibrium path beliefs when it becomes important to be specific.
Note that the presence of shoppers requires a different general analysis than the
one considered in the previous Section. The best way to see that is by considering a
situation where the manufacturer puts positive probability on two prices w0 and ρ and
where G(w0, ρ) and G(w0, w0) are strictly positive. Consider then a retailer who observe
a wholesale price w0. In the presence of shoppers, this retailer will not choose p
m(w0)
as there is a probability that the other retailer has observed the same wholesale price in
which case they compete for the shoppers. Following standard arguments, retailers will
randomize their pricing behaviour in this case and F (p;w0) is determined as follows. A
retailer’s expected profit setting price p < ρ after observing wholesale price w0 is
pir(p;w0) = Q(p, w0)(p− w0). (6)
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with
Q(p, w0) =
1 + λ
2
G(w0, ρ)
G(w0, ρ) +G(w0, w0)
+
G(w0, w0)
G(w0, ρ) +G(w0, w0)
(
1− λ
2
+ λ(1− F (p;w0))
)
This expression can be understood as follows. After observing w0 with probability
G(w0,ρ)
G(w0,ρ)+G(w0,w0)
the rival retailer has obtained a wholesale price of ρ and in that case
the retailer attracts all shoppers and half of the non-shoppers if he sets a price p < ρ
and the other retailer optimally prices at ρ. with the remaining probability the rival
retailer also observed a wholesale price of w0 and each retailer gets his share of the
non-shoppers and all of the shoppers if they have the lowest retail price. Equating (6)
with the profit the retailer makes when setting (a price just below) ρ after observing
wholesale price w0, given by
pir(ρ;w0) =
(
1− λ
2
+ λ
G(w0, ρ)
G(w0, ρ) +G(w0, w0)
)
(ρ− w0),
yields the retailer’s mixed pricing decision F (p;w0). As this expression depends on
G(w0, ρ)/G(w0, w0), the expected manufacturer profit of selling to a retailer at w0 does
not only depend on w0 (as in the previous Section), but also on the ratio of these
probabilities. For a given w0, the more relative weight given to G(w0, w0), the larger
the expected manufacturer profit of selling to a retailer at w0 as there will be more
competition between retailers.
In the next subsection we show that under commitment the manufacturer may want
to avoid these complications by setting the lowest wholesale price w0 with positive
probability such that G(w0, w0) = 0.
4.1 Price commitment
It is clear that if s is large enough, it remains true that the manufacturer optimally
sets the same wholesale price to both retailers, as in the previous Section. For large
s, the consumer reservation price ρ is irrelevant for the manufacturer’s or the retailers’
pricing decisions and if the manufacturer cannot manipulate the search incentives of
the non-shoppers anyway, then there is no benefit to setting different wholesale prices.
The situation for smaller s is more interesting and we show that the analysis of the
previous Section for the price commitment case remains valid for small values of λ and
s and that the manufacturer wants to choose negatively affiliated wholesale prices. To
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do so, we denote by pi(w,w;λ) the manufacturer profit in a market with a fraction λ
of shoppers in case she contracts both retailers at the same wholesale price w for sure,
i.e., G(w,w) = 1. It is clear that pi(wm, wm; 0) = pim and pi(w,w;λ) is continuous and
increasing in λ.
Thus, like in the previous Section consider a manufacturer randomizing over two
prices, w0 and ρ, where w0 ≤ wm and G(w0, w0) = 0. It is easy to see that a retailer
getting a wholesale price w0 will respond by setting p
m(w0) and that all shoppers will
buy at pm(w0). Using the notation of the previous Section, we can write manufacturer
profits as
Π = 2G(w0, ρ)
(
1 + λ
2
pi(w0) +
1− λ
2
pi(ρ)
)
+G(ρ, ρ)pi(ρ), (7)
where the reservation price ρ continues to be determined by
G(w0, ρ)
G(ρ, ρ) +G(w0, ρ)
∫ ρ
pm(w0)
D(p)dp = s. (8)
Using the same pricing strategy as in case without shoppers, for small enough s the
manufacturer profit is smaller than in the case without shoppers as all shoppers buy at
the lower price yielding lower profits, while pi(w0) and pi(ρ) are the same as before.
Without shoppers, we know that for all s < ŝ, pi(wm, wm; 0) = pim < pi(ρ). As
pi(w,w;λ) is continuous in λ it follows that for λ small enough, the manufacturer finds
it optimal to keep the asymmetric structure of retail contracts.
Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5. For any s < ŝ, there exists a λs > 0 such that for all λ < λs there exists
a unique optimal contract with support on w0 < w
m and ρ ≥ wm and G(w0, w0) = 0.
4.2 No Price commitment
Next, we consider the case where the manufacturer cannot commit to a certain pricing
strategy. This is the case analyzed in Janssen and Shelegia (2015). They restricted the
manufacturer to offer both retailers the same linear contract. Importantly for our paper,
they found that a pure strategy equilibrium does not always exist. We first show that
if the manufacturer can discriminate among retailers, an equilibrium always exists (but
may not be unique). Indeed, even restricting retailers to symmetric beliefs following an
off-the-equilibrium path wholesale price (which is the closest assumption to the original
model), there is a continuum of equilibrium outcomes with the manufacturer making
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different profit levels if the search cost is small enough.
Following Janssen and Shelegia (2015), consider a candidate wholesale price schedule
whereby the manufacturer sets the same wholesale price w to both retailers in order to
maximize
pi(w, p¯(w);λ) = w(1− λ)
∫ p¯(w)
p(w)
D(p)f(p;w) dp+ 2wλ
∫ p¯(w)
p(w)
D(p)f(p;w)(1− F (p;w) dp (9)
subject to
F (p) =
1 + λ
2λ
− (1− λ)(p¯(w)− w)D(p¯(w))
2λ(p− w)D(p) (10)
where p¯(w) = min{pm(w), ρ}. Denote by w∗ the optimal manufacturer price in such an
equilibrium, if it exists. The associated profit level is increasing in λ and decreasing in
s. Janssen and Shelegia (2015) show that if λ and s are such that the manufacturer’s
equilibrium profit exceeds ρD(ρ) an equilibrium exists, while it fails to exist otherwise.
Equilibrium existence is, therefore, an issue if s and λ are relatively small.
The easiest way to establish existence of equilibrium once we allow the manufacturer
to correlate her pricing decisions is to construct an equilibrium with G(ρ, ρ) > 0 and
G(wm, ρ) > 0. In the proof of Proposition 6 below we show that we can proceed
as follows. Slightly modify the definition of pi(w, p¯(w);λ) in (9) by having p¯(w) =
min{pm(w), z}, where z is the smallest price (as a function of w) such that zD(z) =
pi(w, p¯(w), λ). By choosing G(wm, ρ)/G(ρ, ρ) small enough, one can arbitrarily increase
the consumer reservation price ρ even for small values of s, such that ρ = z. In this
way, one can make it unattractive for the manufacturer to deviate to ρ. As long as
G(ρ, ρ) + G(w∗, ρ) > 0, it is also convenient to define pi(λ) = maxw pi(w, p¯(w);λ) and
we show that one can always implement a manufacturer profit that is arbitarily close
to pi(λ) as an equilibrium outcome.7
For many parameter values there are, however, many roots to the equation zD(z) =
pi(w, z, λ), since the optimal policy of the manufacturer depends on the beliefs of con-
sumers. These solutions may also constitute an equilibrium and we denote by Π(s, λ)
the lowest manufacturer profit such that zD(z) = pi(w, z, λ).
The equilibrium payoff set is even larger if we allow for more general belief systems.
In particular, we can have the manufacturer randomizing over two prices wm and ρ, and
setting G(wm, wm) = 0 so that G(ρ, ρ)+2G(wm, ρ) = 1. Writing expected manufacturer
7One cannot implement pi(λ) as to have z as the consumer reservation price, we should have
G(wm, ρ), G(ρ, ρ) > 0, implying G(wm, wm) < 1.
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profits as
Π = 2G(wm, ρ)
(
1 + λ
2
pim +
1− λ
2
pi(ρ)
)
+G(ρ, ρ)pi(ρ),
we can repeat the argument of Section 3.1 to argue that for small enough s one should
choose ρ such that pim = pi(ρ) and the ratio of G(ρ, ρ) to G(wm, ρ) such that (1) is
satisfied. The main difference with the argument in section 3.1 is that in the presence
of shoppers we should have that G(wm, wm) = 0 as otherwise the expected manufacturer
profit of selling to a retailer at wm is not equal to pim. The remaining arguments in
Section 3.1. remain valid and, in particular, there is no incentive for any player to
deviate from these strategies. Note that in this equilibrium, manufacturer profits are
low and equal to the profits without shoppers, since the manufacturer does not benefit
from the potential competition between retailers. This may not be an equilibrium under
symmetric beliefs, however, as when the manufacturer deviates to say wm + ε, for some
small ε > 0, retailers believe that they both have received the same wholesale price and
they compete for the shoppers accordingly. For other retailer and consumer beliefs the
manufacturer cannot benefit from deviating, however, as even if he would choose, for
example, a wholesale price of wm + ε to both retailers, their beliefs can be such that
they would continue to choose pm(wm + ε).8
Thus, we have the following Proposition.
Proposition 6. Assuming retailers hold symmetric out-of-equilibrium beliefs, for any
λ ∈ (0, 1) there exists some s¯(λ) such that for all s < s¯(λ) a continuum of equilib-
ria exists, with associated manufacturer profit pi ∈ [pi(s, λ), pi(λ)),where pim ≤ pi(s, λ).
Further, for some retailer out-of-equilibrium beliefs every pi ∈ [pim, pi(λ)) can be imple-
mented as an equilibrium outcome for every s > 0.
Note that Proposition 6 does not claim that pi(λ) is an upper bound on the profit
of the manufacturer. A surprising fact is that the properties of the distribution of
wholesale prices differs in the range [pim, pi(λ)). The lowest possible equilibrium pim can
only be obtained by having perfect negative correlation of wholesale prices and in this
case, the retail prices are also perfectly negative correlated. In the best equilibrium
for the manufacturer in this class the wholesale prices are positively correlated as both
G(w∗, z) and G(z, z) are arbitrarily small. In this equilibrium the degree of correlation
also depends on the search cost as G(w∗, z)/G(z, z) should be smaller, the lower the
search cost.
8Deviating to out-of-equilibrium prices also does not benefit the manufacturer if retailers beieve
that the other retailer has received a wholesale price of for example ρ.
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5 Two-Part Tariffs
Finally, we turn our attention to non-linear contracts between manufacturer and re-
tailers and consider the case where the manufacturer cannot commit and there is a
positive fraction of shoppers. It is well-known that in the absence of retail competition,
two-part tariffs are optimal for the manufacturer. In the presence of retail competition,
however, there is an important caveat, namely that equilibrium contracts depend on
out-of-equilibrium beliefs of retailers. Rey and Verge´ (2004) show that optimal contracts
may not exist when retailers have passive beliefs. The reason is that if a manufacturer
provides an unexpected contract with a low per-unit price and a high fixed fee, and the
retailer believes that her receives the equilibrium contract, then her rival may be willing
to accept the contract expecting to gain a large market share due to its cost advantage
in the retail market. In such a case, it is indeed optimal for the manufacturer to deviate
to such an unexpected contract to both retailers, making the contract unprofitable for
each of them (see also Inderst (2010)). Following Rey and Verge´ (2004) and McAfee
and Schwartz (1994) we use wary beliefs instead: when it receives an unexpected offer,
a retailer anticipates the manufacturer acts optimally with its rival retailers, given the
offer just received and that the manufacturer believes that he will accept the unexpected
offer.
Our analysis on two-part tariffs proceeds in two steps. First, we show that with
symmetric contracts the set of equilibrium payoffs for the monopolist is bounded above
by a certain profit Π∗(s, λ). Second, we discuss the existence of asymmetric equilibria
where the manufacturer offers different contracts to different retailers. One retailer re-
ceives a two-part tariff with a low per-unit price, while the other retailer receives a high
price and no fixed fee. In these equilibria with asymmetric contracts, the manufacturer
obtains the same profit level with both contracts and has, therefore, no incentives to
deviate and offer both firms the same contract. We show that these asymmetric con-
tracts are not dominated by any other asymmetric configuration and for some parameter
configurations they dominate any equilibrium with symmetric two-part tariffs.
5.1 Symmetric Contracts
We start with the symmetric contract case. Let {w, T} be the equilibrium contract and
piR(w) = (1− λ)D(p¯(w))(p¯(w)− w) the expected variable profit of a retailer observing
w. Given any w, retailers expect their rival to receive the same contract so that T must
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satisfy T ≤ piR(w). Let F (p | w) be the retail distribution and let Fmin(p | w) denote
the distribution of the minimum price among both retailers. The per-retailer profit of
the manufacturer equals
Π = w{(1− λ)
∫
D(p)dF (p | w) + λ
∫
D(p)dFmin(p | w)}+ piR(w). (11)
Proposition 7. The maximal manufacturer profit that can be implemented by choosing
symmetric two part tariffs, denoted by Π∗(s, λ), is decreasing in s and non-monotone
in λ with Π∗(s, 0) = Π∗(s, 1) > Π∗(s, λ) for all 0 < λ < 1.
Note that both when λ = 0 and when λ = 1, the manufacturer can obtain the
monopoly profits of a vertically integrated firm. With λ = 0, the manufacturer opti-
mally sets w = 0 and capture all profits through the fixed component T. With λ = 1,the
manufacturer may set w at the integrated monopoly level with the fixed component
T = 0. Figure 2 depicts the optimal contract for linear demand D(p) = 1 − p and
s = 0.02 for different values of λ ∈ (0, 0.5). The blue line depicts the linear component
of the optimal two-part tariff, the other two lines correspond to the lower and the upper
bound of the price distribution.Generally, as λ increases, the distribution of retail prices
becomes more concentrated at the bottom, inducing a higher w, as can be seen in the
Figure. Also, the difference between the upper and lower bound (in the legend of the
Figure denoted by pl) of the retail price distribution becomes larger.
It is also important to note that for intermediate values of λ the manufacturer cannot
obtain the profit of the fully integrated monopolist even if it chooses the optimal two-
part tariff. The reason is that from the point of view of the manufacturer, the retail
price dispersion that always arises with λ ∈ (0, 1) creates noise for her profit function.
Appropriating the retailers’ expected profit through T is not affecting the fact that some
noise remains. As for any choice of {w, T} the maximal profit is that of an integrated
monopolist, noise implies that the realized profit is smaller (see also Figure 3 below).
5.2 Asymmetric Contracts
We now move to a more general class of equilibria involving asymmetric contracts across
different retailers. As we have seen before, asymmetric contracts reduce competition
between retailers and this may be suboptimal for the manufacturer. With two-part
tariffs, the positive side of asymmetric contracts for the manufacturer is that they
induce a pure strategy equilibrium in retail prices that eliminates the price dispersion
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Figure 2: Wholesale price (blue line) and bounds of the support of the retail price
distribution (red and yellow lines) in the optimal symmetric contract for different values
of λ.
that is responsible for the manufacturer not being able to obtain the profit of a fully
integrated monopolist. In general, it is very difficult to compare analytically the gains
and losses due to these sources of profit loss for the manufacturer. In this Section,
we first show that an equilibrium with asymmetric contracts exists, and then show
numerically that these equilibria may be better for the manufacturer for intermediate
values of λ. Thus, manufacturers may also induce asymmetries between retailers even
in the presence of two-part tariffs.
In any asymmetric equilibrium without commitment it must be that the manufac-
turer is indifferent among all contracts. Since without price dispersion, manufacturer
profits must be equal at both contracts, this basically imposes that there should be
two retail prices {p1, p2} such that p1 < pm(0) < p2 and p1D(p1) = p2D(p2).9 It is
obvious that the retailer observing the lowest wholesale linear component will be able
to set the monopoly price, so that p1 = p
m(w1). It should be the case that the retailer
observing the higher wholesale linear component prefers to charge p2 and get demand
(1− λ)D(p2) to a deviation to p1 − ε so as to get demand (1 + λ)D(p1 − ε). Hence, in
an asymmetric equilibrium with two-part tariffs, the following restriction should hold:
(p2 − w2)(1− λ)D(p2) ≥ (p1 − w2)(1 + λ)D(p1), (12)
9That is, profits from the perspective of the manufacturer. If this condition is not met, the manu-
facturer could deviate and offer the same contract to both retailers and increase its profit.
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and given the equal profit condition, this implies
(1− λ)p2 − w2
p2
≥ (1 + λ)p1 − w2
p1
.
Optimality of the contract requires that p2 = p¯(w2) = ρ = min{pm(w2), ρ}, since if
pm(w2) < ρ the manufacturer can strictly improve her profit by deviating to w
∗
2 −
 leading the retailer to charge pm(w∗2 − ) which would strictly improve profits as
pm(w2) > p
m(0) . This condition imposes an upper bound on s for which asymmetric
contracts can be charged in equilibrium. As a result, we have the following Proposition.
Proposition 8. For any λ > 0, there exists a s(λ) such that for all s ∈ (0, s(λ)) an
asymmetric equilibrium exists with contracts {w1, T1} and {ρ, 0} with
pm(w1)D(p
m(w1)) = ρD(ρ) (13)
and T1 = (p
m − w1)D(pm(w1)). Further, w1 < 0.
Numerically, we now show that for intermediate values of λ and small values of s
the manufacturer profit in this asymmetric equilibrium can be higher than the maximal
profit in a symmetric equilibrium. This is depicted in Figure 3 for linear demand and
search cost s = 0.02. The blue line is the profit level in the optimal symmetric contract,
while the red line is the profit in the asymmetric contract. It is clear that for λ = 0
and λ = 1 the best symmetric contract cannot be beaten. Also, the profit level in
the asymmetric contract is independent of λ. The Figure shows, however, that for
intermediate values of λ, the asymmetric contract is better and its relative improvement
increases with λ. The Figure does not show the analysis for λ close to 1 as the numerical
analysis becomes relatively imprecise with most of the probability mass concentrated
at the lowest retail prices, but the support of the retail price distribution not shrinking
to 0.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have looked at the incentive of manufacturers to treat retailers that
sell their product to consumers asymmetrically. In general, as manufacturers have an
incentive to lower retailer margins, they face a trade-off. On one hand, manufacturers
may sell to different retailers at different prices to stimulate consumer search. Con-
sumers that observe a relatively high price may infer that the chance they observe a
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Figure 3: Gains from asymmetric contracts.
low price on their next search is considerably high and this will limit the market power
of retailers. On the other hand, by creating an asymmetry retailers are competing less
fierce for consumers who anyway consider all price offers before buying. This paper
analyzes how manufacturers optimally deal with this trade-off in a variety of settings.
We first considered a situation where the competition aspect is absent as all con-
sumers have to pay a search cost and typically will only visit one retailer. In that case
we have analyzed three levels of commitment by the manufacturer: full commitment
to a random price schedule, no commitment and partial commitment. Without com-
mitment, the manufacturer’s maximal profit equals the double marginalization profit,
which he can reach with a variety of pricing schemes. With full commitment and small
search costs, the manufacturer chooses a negative correlation structure between a low
price and the consumer reservation price. The purpose of the low price the consumer
reservation price, which is the price that attracts most of the sales. When the search
cost becomes arbitrarily small the manufacturer may find it optimal to choose the low
price below cost, but with low probability. By doing so, the manufacturer prevents the
Diamond paradox from arising and makes profits that are close to monopoly profits.
Under partial commitment, the manufacturer may announce that one of the retailers
get the status of premium re-seller and that this retailer gets a lower wholesale price.
Having a system of premium re-sellers may thus increase the manufacturer’s profits and
consumer welfare.
With competition for shoppers the analysis becomes more complicated. In this case,
the manufacturer may stimulate competition between retailers by choosing identical
wholesale prices with some positive probability. Generally speaking, competition for
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shoppers gives manufacturers in their most preferred equilibrium an incentive to choose
prices with a positive affiliation. We also show that by having some correlation between
the wholesale prices resolves the non-existence problem that is present in Janssen and
Shelegia (2015)
Finally, we show that also under two-part tariffs the manufacturer may have an
incentive to choose asymmetric contracts. In this case, the reason is that search creates
price dispersion at the retail level and this price dispersion creates noise into the man-
ufacturer profit function, which limits the manufacturer’s ability to extract maximal
rents. By choosing asymmetric contracts, the manufacturer is able to eliminate this
noise but only at the expense of having less retail competition. When the retail price
dispersion is maximal, the manufacturer may be better off under asymmetric contracts.
Generally, this paper is the first showing that in distribution channels where the
retail market to final consumers is characterised by consumer search, manufacturers
have an incentive to treat retailers asymmetrically. New theoretical and empirical
research may focus on the question how manufacturers may want to organize their
distribution channel, or reversely how retailers may organize their supply, in consumer
search markets.
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A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. Let w be the lower bound of the wholesale price distribution. By
the preceding argument, p(w) = pm(w). Now suppose that w > wm and consider a
deviation to wm. This shift induces a first order shift on the retail price distribution
and since wD(p(w) is decreasing for w > wm, it induces an increase in profits. Hence,
no price above wm and such that p(wm) < ρ can be optimal. In order to complete
the proof we show that there exists a unique price w ≤ wm charged in equilibrium. In
order to see this, we shall fix for now a certain reservation price ρ and consider the most
efficient way to implement it. Let qj be the mass on price wj < ρ and let S(p, p
′) be
the difference in consumer surplus between p and p′. The problem can be written as
max
q
∑
qj (wjD(p(wj)− ρD(ρ)))∑
qjS(p(wj), ρ) ≥ s
qj ≥ 0
with the additional constraint that
∑
qj ≤ 1. If this additional constraint is not binding,
we have that since S(p, p′) is decreasing and convex and wD(p(w)) is increasing and
concave, this is a linear program in qj whose solution is (generically) q(wj) > 0 iff
wj = w0.
10 If the additional constraint were binding, then the monopolist would not
put any mass at ρ. In that case, the profit level cannot exceed wm and so the optimal
distribution has only one atom.
Proof of Proposition 3. We can rewrite the profit level as
Π = 2{pi(ρ)−G(w0, ρ)(pi(ρ)− pi(w0))} (14)
where
G(w0, ρ)
1−G(w0, ρ)
∫ ρ
pm
D(p)dp = s (15)
10In non-generic cases, the solution may be multiple but there still exists an optimal binary distri-
bution.
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In order to increase the gains from search at lower prices, the manufacturer has two
instruments. First, it may increase the probability that a single store offers the best
deal (G(w0, ρ)). Second, it may reduce the lowest price (w0) so that p
m(w0) yields a
better deal for the consumer. Let q0 = G(w0, ρ) and notice that
∂Π
∂q0
= 2(1− q0)pi′(ρ) ∂ρ
∂q0
− 2(pi(ρ)− pi(w0)) (16)
while
∂Π
∂w0
= 2(1− q0)pi′(ρ) ∂ρ
∂w0
+ 2q0pi
′(w0). (17)
In an interior solution we must have that
pi(ρ)− pi(w0)
2q0pi′(w0)
= −
∂ρ
∂w0
∂ρ
∂q0
. (18)
It is obvious then that w0 < w
m as long as pi(ρ) > pi(w0). This is the case if the
manufacturer can secure a profit level above the double marginalization equilibrium.
Notice also that
∂ρ
∂w0
=
D(pm(w0))
D(ρ)
(19)
and
∂ρ
∂q0
=
−s
q20D(ρ)
(20)
Combining all of these pieces we have
pi(ρ)− pi(w0)
pi′(w0)
D(pm(w0) =
s
q0
(21)
This condition depends on the demand function. For linear demand the LHS has a
minimum in w0 ∈ (0, 1/2) while the RHS is decreasing in w0. For future reference,
notice that w0 = 0, LHS equals pi(ρ). . In addition, we have that
− (1− q0)pi
′(ρ)
D(ρ)
= q0
pi′(w0)
D(pm(w0))
(22)
This condition can be understood as a marginal return of an increase in each of the two
prices must be proportional to their impact on ρ.
Proof of Proposition 4. For the first part, choose w∗0 < 0 so that
∫ pm
pm(w∗0)
D(p)dp = s1
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for some s1 > 0 and consider the sequence of search costs {sn} = s1n . For each sn in
the sequence, w0(n) = w
∗
0 and ρ(n) = p
m. Thus, q0(n)→ 0 so that profits converge to
monopoly. Now, to see that wm > w0 ≥ 0 is suboptimal for s small enough, consider
first the case in which w0 > w
∗ for any s. Clearly, the profit is a linear combination
of w0D(p
m(w0) and ρD(ρ) and both would be bounded away from monopoly level.
Hence, it must be that w0 converges to zero as s vanishes. So assume that this is the
case and notice that, along any such sequence of optimal contracts, it must be that
sn/q0(n) = δ(n)pi(ρ(n)) for some sequence δ(n) < 1 converging to 1. In such a case,
the consumers’ reservation price is∫ ρ¯
pm
D(p)dp =
(1− q0(n)sn
q0(n)
(23)
≥ (1− q0(n∗))λ(n∗)pi(ρ(n∗)) > wmD(pm(wm)) (24)
for some n∗ large enough. But then ρ¯ is bounded away from pm(0) and so the man-
ufacturer cannot obtain monopoly profits. Thus, w0 = 0 is not a solution for the
system.
Proof of Proposition 6. We begin by a description of the equilibrium strategies.
1. The manufacturer randomizes with support in w∗ and ρ, with joint distribution
G(w1, w2).
2. Retailer i observes wi and chooses pi according to
• If wi < w∗, pi = pm(wi).
• If wi = w∗, pi follows F (p;w∗)
• If ρ > wi > w∗, pi = min{pm(wi), ρ}
• If wi ≥ ρ, pi = wi
3. Consumers follow a reservation price strategy so that they buy a quantity D(pi)
right away iff pi ≤ ρ and they search otherwise.
We now show that these strategies constitute an equilibrium.
First, it is clear that w∗ and ρ have to give the same profits for the manufacturer to
randomize. We can compute its profit using
pi(w∗) =
(
(1− λ)
∫ p¯(w∗)
p(w∗)
D(p)f(p;w∗) dp+ 2λ
∫ p¯(w∗)
p(w∗)
D(p)f(p;w∗)(1− F (p;w∗) dp
)
w∗.
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It must hold then that
pi(w∗) = ρD(ρ). (25)
For a given G(w1, w2), we have a unique F (p;w
∗) so that given w∗ and G(w1, w2),
there is a unique ρ that satisfies this relation. Importantly, F (p;w∗) only depends on
G(w∗, w∗), while ρ has to satisfy
G(w∗, ρ)
G(w∗, ρ) +G(ρ, ρ)
∫ ∫ ρ
p
D(t)dtf(p;w∗)dp = s (26)
So we can pick ρ by appropriately choosing the conditional probability that the other
retailer observed w∗ given that the retailer the consumer visited observed ρ.
Moreover, given the strategy profile of retailers, the manufacturer has no incentive to
deviate to any other price.11 Similarly, consumers’ indifference condition is satisfied at
ρ. For simplicity, we assume that if the consumer observes any price outside the support
of the equilibrium retail price distribution, he assumes that the retailer observed a price
of ρ. Therefore, in order to ensure that he follows a reservation price strategy we need
to verify that the gains from search following any price in the support of the price
distribution renders search unprofitable. Notice that this is not guaranteed by the fact
that the upper bound of the support is no higher than ρ since the beliefs are different.
In particular, it must hold that
G(w∗, w∗)
G(w∗, w∗) +G(w∗, ρ)
∫ ∫ p¯(w)
p
D(t)dtf(p;w∗)dp ≤ s. (27)
This implies that if p¯(w) = ρ, a necessary condition is that G(w∗, w∗) ∗ G(ρ, ρ) ≤
G2(ρ, w∗) (i.e., that the wholesale price distribution exhibits negative affiliation). If
p¯(w) < ρ, this condition is only sufficient but not necessary.
We turn now to the problem of the retailers. Since they hold symmetric beliefs,
for every w < ρ, they should charge a price according to F (p;w), with upper-bound
p¯m(w, z).
Notice that for each z > pm(0), F (p;w) is maximized at some w0(z). Hence, an
equilibrium requires the manufacturer to choose w0(ρ). The profits obtained by charging
ρ are ρD(ρ) are single-peaked. If ρ > pm(0), then, ρD(ρ) is decreasing and equals 0 for
ρ sufficiently large. On the other hand, the profits associated with w0(z) are decreasing
11Notice, in particular, that the upper bound of the distribution of retail prices following w∗ is no
higher than pm(w∗ and that pD(p) is decreasing in the relevant range
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in z but whenever z > pm(w), profits become constant. Hence, these two functions
intersect at least once for some z > pm(0).
Define s¯(λ) such that if G(w∗, ρ) = 0.5, ρD(ρ) = pi(λ). For any s < s¯(λ), there are
then many possible combinations of z, w0(z) that yield an equilibrium and, generically,
they will give different payoffs. Because both are continuous functions, the equilibrium
set is compact. By definition, Π(s, λ) is the lower bound of such support. Notice
that Π(s, λ) ≥ pim since, regardless of the upper-bound of the price distribution, the
monopolist can obtain pim by setting w = pm. On the other hand, if s = s¯(λ), pi(λ) is
independent of z, so that there exists a single possible payoff level and Π(s, λ) = Π(λ).
Finally, if s > s¯(λ), the consumers’ reservation price is no longer binding and so the
equilibrium no longer involves randomization. This was the equilibrium characterized
in Janssen and Shelegia (2015)
We now show that for every payoff vector in [pim, pi(λ)] there is an equilibrium that
implements it. To show this, we shall use wary beliefs so that for every w off-the-
equilibrium path triggers a belief so that the retailer optimally charges pm(w). It is
clear that no equilibrium can exist whereby the monopolist obtains less than the double
marginalization profit since in such a case the monopolist can deviate toG(wm, wm) = 1,
and each retailer will choose p(wm) ≤ pm(wm). Notice also that to implement pi(λ) we
need that G(w∗, w∗) = 1 so that F (p;w∗) is defined by (10). This equilibrium payoff can
be implemented exactly on only if ρ > pm(w∗). Otherwise, we can obtain an equilibrium
that is arbitrarily close to it.12 Consider the following class of equilibria that span the
whole set. First, fix w∗ = w(λ), the wholesale price that induces the highest possible
profit level, and consider the equilibria indexed by G(w(λ), w(λ)) ∈ [q(λ), 1], where
q(λ) is the lowest value such that (i) the expected profit at w(λ) is at least as high as
the double-marginalization profit and (ii) G(w(λ), w(λ)) ∗G(ρ, ρ) ≥ G2(ρ, w(λ)) . It is
clear that if G(w(λ), w(λ) = 0, then the profit level associated with this distribution is
no higher than that of the double-marginalization. By continuity, there exists a unique
such value and because the profit function is continuous in F (p) and F (p) is continuous
in G(w(λ), w(λ)) an equilibrium exists for each value above the one corresponding to
q(λ). If the profit level associated with it is the double-marginalization profit, the result
follows. If the profit level is higher, it must be that G(w∗, w∗) ∗ G(ρ, ρ) = G2(ρ, w∗).
Now, fix the distribution G(w1, w2) to satisfy this condition and consider the equilibria
indexed by w˜ ≤ w(λ). Because F is First-Order Stochastically ranked on w, the
12The problem is that if G(w∗, w∗) = 1, observing ρ does not lead the consumer to believe that
wi = ρ but rather wi = w
∗.
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indifference constraints hold. Because the profit function is continuous, there is an
equilibrium that yields each profit level in the desired range.
Proof of Proposition 7. Fix an equilibrium contract {w, T} and consider a deviation to
some other contract {w′, T ′} and consider the belief that their rival received another
contract {w′′, T ′′} such that pm(w′′) ≥ w′. In such a case, it is optimal for the retailer re-
ceiving the deviating contract to choose p¯(w′m(w′)} and get profits (1−λ)p¯(w′)D(p¯(w′)).
Thus, they will accept a fee T ′ = (1−λ)(p¯(w′)−w′)D(p¯(w′)). These deviations (if given
to both firms simultaneously) give profits (1 − λ)(p¯(w′) − w′)D(p¯(w′)) + w′D(p¯(w′)).
Let Π0 be the maximum of such profits. On the other hand, given some (s, λ) and some
common linear component of the contract w, the equilibrium price distribution is F (p)
as derived before. This yields the required conditions. For the comparative statics,
simply notice that if λ ∈ (0, 1), F is non-degenerate and this puts an upper bound on∫
pD(p)dF (p | w), and, thus, on overall profits. To see the effect of s just notice that if
s < s∗(λ), p¯ = ρ and ρ decreases in s. As a result the variance of F increases in s and
so profits decrease in s.
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